Summary
The likely passage of
Egypt's new charter,
while a crucial victory
for the military
regime, does not
mean that stability
will return to the
country. Six months
after the ousting of
former President
Mohammed Morsi,
Cairo held its national
plebiscite on the constitution Jan. 14 and 15. In the three years since the
overthrow of the Hosni Mubarak government, this is Egypt's third
constitutional referendum and the sixth time the nation has gone to the polls.
Even after the charter is settled, Egypt's next elections are unlikely to produce
a viable civilian alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood -- one that is capable of
preventing the military from ruling from behind the scenes. The result will be
more issues with governance and legitimacy.
Analysis
Egypt has wrapped up the second and final day of the referendum on a
constitution that the military regime sees as a means of not only normalizing
the post-coup political process but also creating a system that solidifies the
interests of the armed forces. The regime of Col. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has
also sought to create a national charter that is palatable to large swathes of
the populace, especially given the challenges the armed forces have faced since the dawn of the multi-party politics era nearly three years ago. Since
Mubarak's fall, the military has struggled to find a civilian partner to replace
the former dictator's National Democratic Party as a governing elite.
That al-Sisi has been promoting himself as the next president speaks volumes
about the armed forces' difficulties in replacing the defunct National
Democratic Party, founded by former President Anwar Sadat and then presided
over by Mubarak for three decades. The rise to power of the Brotherhood in
2012 briefly created the possibility that a military-Islamist understanding of
sorts would usher in a new era, but the Islamist movement's considerable
opposition from the beginning gained strength when the Brotherhood alienated
non-Islamist forces. The Brotherhood's inability to engage in the politics of
compromise created a situation in which the military was forced to remove the
Morsi government Although the military, through force, has been able to contain the civil
resistance mounted by the Brotherhood and its allies (mainly smaller Islamist
parties), as well as the insurgency mounted by jihadists, it is still struggling to
normalize the situation in the country and secure indemnity for the coup. A
key reason for its ability to manage the backlash to the coup has been its
broad support from an array of political forces, including the second-largest
Islamist movement, the Salafist al-Nour Party, which backed the coup and has
remained a supporter of the transition.
Salafists: The Military's Islamist Ally?
While it had only one seat on the body that drafted the new charter, al-Nour
has been mobilizing its supporters to approve the referendum, a move that will
go a long way in countering the Brotherhood's call for a boycott of the vote.
Al-Nour's stance is informed by its desire to fill the void left by the decline of
the Brotherhood. As a result, it has played a key role as the only Islamist
entity to participate in the drafting of the new document and was able to gain
certain concessions on the role of religion in politics.
Al-Nour has made a dramatic transition from being an ultraconservative
movement that rejected democracy and shunned politics to one displaying a
great deal of pragmatism. In the wake of the Brotherhood's collapse, al-Nour
is the single-most organized party, evidenced by the fact that it garnered a
quarter of the votes in the 2011-12 parliamentary elections. In the next round
of legislative elections -- expected in the latter half of the year, after the
presidential vote in April -- al-Nour is unlikely to repeat its performance, but it
could still emerge as the largest bloc in parliament. There is still the problem
that the new constitution strictly prohibits religious parties, but since al-Nour is
the only Islamist group that supports the new constitution, it has likely struck
a deal with the military.
a deal with the military.
Al-Nour's goals serve the military's purposes because the military needs to
ensure that the Brotherhood, which has been uncompromising in its stance on
the coup, does not regain its strength. Furthermore, the armed forces need to
show that the post-coup roadmap has broad national support that transcends
ideology. This much the military has achieved, but its real challenge is to
ensure that the new order can create a civilian leadership that cannot
challenge the military and, more important, can administer the political
economy of the country.
The military cannot escape the dilemma it was caught in when it was forced to
remove Mubarak and the National Democratic Party: There is no single political
force with which the army can partner. Al-Nour's support is helpful, but the
military wants to avoid repeating what happened with the Brotherhood. The
military will rely on al-Nour to keep the Islamist camp split, but there are
limits to how much political ground the army is willing to cede to al-Nour,
especially since it lacks a reliable secular party to counter-balance it.
The Problem of the Presidency
There is currently no coherent secular political force that the army can rely on,
though there is a range of small parties and personalities that could be cobbled
into a coalition. However, many secular and centrist forces are uncomfortable
with a military-dominated political system, further weakening the non-Islamist
camp. For this reason, the army is caught between the choice to either field alSisi as the presidential candidate or put up a former commander, such as
former chief of the army staff Lt. Gen. Sami Annan. The problem with the
latter option is that most of the old commanders are tainted due to their
association with Mubarak. More important, since the coup, a public relations
campaign promoting al-Sisi as the stabilizer of the country has made an
impact on many Egyptians eager to see the power vacuum in Cairo filled by a
strong leader.
However, many supporters of the
regime (such as UAE Prime
Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin
Rashid al-Maktoum) and some
within it are uncomfortable with
the notion of al-Sisi seeking the
presidency. They are concerned
that al-Sisi's bid could further
destabilize the polity, which the
Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council
has been trying to repair through the injection of financial
assistance. Although the United
States announced on Jan. 15 that it would resume aid to Cairo, the U.S.
administration needs al-Sisi to maintain at least the appearance of civilian
supremacy over the military. This is why U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel
has made more than 25 calls to Egypt's leaders in the six months since the
coup, the most recent of which occurred Jan. 13.
What is unclear is whether al-Sisi would remain as army chief while running
for president, as was the case with former Pakistani President Pervez
Musharraf. Stratfor has written about how there are similarities between the
civil-military struggles of present-day Egypt and Pakistan in the 1990s. The
referendum and al-Sisi's presidential bid has parallels with former Pakistani
military ruler Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's referendum in 1984 that set the
stage for military-controlled civilian rule with Zia as president. In fact, alNour's collaboration with the al-Sisi regime is similar to the relationship that
the Zia regime enjoyed with Pakistan's Islamist party, Jamaat-e-Islami. It
would be less controversial for him to hand over leadership of the military to a
successor, but then it could lead to a power struggle between al-Sisi and the
new army chief.
Of course, al-Sisi, even as a civilian president, would shepherd the interests of
the military. However, the armed forces would still be the primary force behind
the regime, and as president, al-Sisi would depend on them. Mubarak's fall
demonstrated how quickly the military will part ways when the president can
no longer govern. Al-Sisi risks a similar fate should he encounter problems of
governance, especially as a civilian president, where he would have a hard
time balancing between the need to placate democratic demands from the
public with the interests of the military. For these reasons, and the fact that it
would be controversial to occupy both posts, al-Sisi may decide to remain as
military chief, where he can be kingmaker.
The Military and the New Charter
No matter who becomes president, the military enhanced its control over
policymaking through amendments in the new constitution. The charter --
drafted by a 50-member, military-appointed and mostly non-Islamist body --
will replace the constitution that was crafted by the Islamist-dominated
Constituent Assembly during the Morsi presidency.
For example, according to Article 141, the president has to have fulfilled
military service -- a new requirement. In addition, Article 234 stipulates that
the defense minister, who is the commander-in-chief, must be from the ranks
of the army and must be approved by the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces (for at least the next two presidential terms).
Forces (for at least the next two presidential terms).
The top national security body, the National Defense Council, which was
already composed of mostly military commanders, is the one entity that can
discuss the military's budget; the charter does not specify who can approve
the budget. Furthermore, the previous law on trying civilians in military courts
for crimes against the armed forces has been enhanced by Article 204, which
defines such crimes as those that take place within military areas. In a move
to further strip the legislature of power, Article 145 states that all treaties that
the government enters into will be put to a national referendum, as opposed to
needing two-thirds support from both houses, as required by the 2012
document.
In fact, the new charter has created a unicameral legislature by eliminating the
upper house. Furthermore, the president has the power to appoint key Cabinet
members -- the ministers of defense, interior, foreign affairs and justice.
Article 137 has done away with the requirement that if the dissolution of
parliament by the president does not gain majority support in the national
referendum, the president must resign. Through these amendments the
military is ensuring that a president, who, by design, will be friendly to military
interests, will be powerful and well insulated and that the important policies of
the state remain outside the purview of civilian political forces that are likely to
gain control of parliament.
The secularists and al-Nour have blessed the new constitution because they
are still trying to ensure that a new system emerges in which the Brotherhood
is not the major player. Once in the new corridors of power, these same forces
will likely be quarreling with each other. More important, they will probably
object to the imbalance of power between civil and military institutions,
especially since the decline of the Egyptian economy is something that no
military or civilian government can adequately address in the immediate term.