Article two of the Egyptian Constitution, which stipulates that Islamic Shariah is the main source of legislation, has attracted a great deal of international speculation due to its controversial nature. But does the application of Shariah really hinder the development of justice and welfare in Egypt as is often alleged in the West? This research paper aims to clearly describe the method that the Supreme Constitutional Court [SCC, the court concerned with the interpretation of article two] uses to determine how Sharah is to be applied in Egypt, challenging the secular view mainly held in the West.
Most reactions to the article appear to stem from concerns in the West that Egypt has explicitly prescribed itself as a religious state, with a religious text that governs as the primary source of law. Some non-Muslim writers argue that by implication, discrimination against non-Muslims is legislated in Egypt and that article two stands in the face of individual freedom, human rights, and democracy. Some Western-influenced writers even claim that Egypt will never be an economically or politically progressive state unless the article is removed. Clark B Lombardi, a professor of Islamic, Constitutional, and Comparative Law, disagrees with this view. He has examined the jurisprudence of Egypt’s SCC and argued that the court is developing a very progressive theory of Islamic law.
The paper outlines the traditional methods of interpreting Shariah. These methods date back to the period following the death of the Prophet Muhammad, when the Muslim community struggled to determine how it would be governed by Shariah. Secondly, the paper considers the political developments that took place in Egypt during the 19 and 20 centuries, and how the executive balanced the need for Egypt’s reform with increasing demands from some groups for Egypt’s Islamization. This led to the enactment of article two and its current wording. Since then, the SCC has taken on the primary role of determining how article two is applied in Egypt, and has developed its own unique theory of Islamic law in fulfilling this mandate. Finally, the paper considers some Western authors’ often emotional views on article two and how their arguments compare to Lombardi’s considered analysis of the SCC’s article two jurisprudence.
Contrary to vocal Western voices, Lombardi’s analysis suggests that the court has developed a methodology that draws from various classical and modern Islamic theories of law which are being used to make decisions that promote justice and welfare in Egypt and to uphold international human rights. Furthermore, the court's jurisprudence does not indicate that it is using Sharah to curb the rights of non-Muslims or to intimidate those who question its methodology, nor is it operating as a de facto arm of the executive. The views of prominent figures in Egypt are much more positive about the application of Shariah law in Egypt, and need to be considered in the debate about article two of the Constitution.