In recent decades, the concept of taqiyya has become a prominent component of Islamophobic discourse in Western societies about the dangers posed by Islam and Muslims. According to this understanding, taqiyya is a doctrinal position in Islamic law which permits or even encourages Muslims to lie about their true intentions or beliefs when engaging non-Muslims and non-Muslim societies. Dialogue Across Borders believes this is a dangerous misconception that does harm to Muslims and is corrosive to interreligious and intercultural relations more generally. In order to provide a more accurate picture of this doctrine, we are publishing an English translation of the lengthy article on taqiyya included in the The Kuwaiti Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence (al-Mawsūʿah al-Fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaytiyyah, Volume 13, pp. 185-200), an influential contemporary authority in Islamic law.

The translation of the article and a useful introduction have been expertly provided by Moḥammed Sayyed Salāma Ibrāhīm, a graduate of al-Azhar University (Cairo, Egypt) in Islamic studies and the Hartford International University for Religion and Peace (Hartford, U.S.). At Hartford International University, Moḥammed completed his master’s thesis on the hiddenness of God in the thought of John Calvin (d. 1564)) and Ibn Taymiyya (d.1328). He has published a book on religious epistemology (An Introduction to the Epistemology of Religion, Beirut: Dār al-Naʿmah, 2022) and translated numerous academic works, including The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Religion. He currently works at the Imām al-Ashʿarī Center for Islamic Theology in Cairo, an institution which operates under the auspices of al-Azhar.

Translator’s Introduction

The concept of taqiyya (تقيّة) has often been misunderstood in Western societies, where it is mischaracterized in certain discourses as permitting Muslims to be duplicitous — ostensibly displaying moral virtues, good conduct, and amicability while concealing a variety of darker intentions about non-Muslims and Islamic conquest. After reviewing the present essay translation, it becomes evident that taqiyya, at least within Sunnī theological discourse, is quite different than this polemical misconception. Fundamentally, the notion of taqiyya is about self-preservation in extreme circumstances.

The discourse on taqiyya arose principally from the historical context of conflict between the early Muslim community and the polytheistic Meccans, who subjected Muslims to severe persecution in an attempt to force them to renounce their faith. In such circumstances, Islamic doctrine permitted individuals to outwardly profess disbelief while maintaining inward conviction, as a temporary measure until they were able to migrate and openly practice their religion. Nevertheless, steadfastness in the face of such trials—accepting death rather than disavowing faith—was regarded as a more virtuous and honorable course. The concept appears to have had more utility within the Shīʿa tradition, whose adherents were very often a minority within Sunnī contexts. In any case, the specific scenario of coerced apostasy under threat of death is no longer present in contemporary Western societies or comparable contexts. If there is a related concept today, it would not concern taqiyya in its authentic historical and theological sense, but rather hypocrisy or disingenuous flattery (mudāhana), wherein one outwardly expresses religious positions contrary to one's convictions for material benefit without duress or coercion. While some Muslims may indeed succumb to such behavior on an individual level, it is unequivocally condemned in Islamic ethics.  Islamic law mandates its opposite—that Muslims exhibit forthright honesty in expressing their religious convictions.

By way of personal experience, I should mention that I was raised in a devout Muslim household in Egypt, yet the idea that one should practice taqiyya in order to deceive non-Muslims or Western societies more generally never surfaced in any religious instruction I received from my family, my neighbors, or the regular Friday sermons I attended in Egyptian mosques. In my experience, most educated Egyptians—let alone those with less schooling—have never even heard the term taqiyya. Their religious attention is directed to the practical demands of daily life and to local devotional practices shaped by their immediate milieu. If that is true of the laity, what can be said about formal religious education? Having studied in the al-Azhar system from primary school through university, I can attest that the notion that taqiyya is obligatory—or even commendable—in Western lands as a strategic prelude to future domination is wholly absent from the curriculum. The claim is so outlandish that al-Azhar scholars typically greet it with laughter. It is simply too divorced from reality to be taken seriously.

It is noteworthy that a similar accusation is sometimes directed by some Muslims toward the Christian minority in Egypt: the idea that the affability of many kind Christians is not genuine but is rather a form of taqiyya. It should be noted that while the specific term taqiyya is largely unknown to the Egyptian laity, they may refer in other ways to the idea that people practice outwardly kind conduct in order to deceive or manipulate others. It appears that a pattern of suspicion toward minorities can instinctively permeate the thinking of some within a majority, regardless of their respective religions or locations. The underlying assumption seems to be that the minority, by virtue of their status, lacks the complete freedom to exhibit their authentic behavior. Instead, their circumstances are perceived as compelling them toward a singular mode of conduct—namely, amiability—leaving one to wonder how they might behave if they were empowered as the majority. This psychological dynamic was evident in a conversation I had with a fellow Muslim—an ordinary individual with no formal religious training or particular interest in theological sciences. I sought to persuade him that genuine benevolence and sincere, kind treatment are not the exclusive preserve of the followers of any single religion or nationality. All people possess the capacity for kindness. Therefore, when one encounters a kind and good person, the default position should be to believe in their sincerity. To presume otherwise requires solid evidence, not conjecture, prior prejudice, or flimsy proof.

The present article, “Taqiyyah,” is extracted from The Kuwaiti Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence (al-Mawsūʿah al-Fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaytiyyah), a monumental contemporary survey of Islamic legal discourse. The work was conceived and executed under the aegis of Kuwait's Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs from 1965 to 2005. This magisterial work, the fruit of more than four decades of rigorous scholarly labor, represents the collective erudition of over two hundred distinguished scholars from across the Islamic world. Extending to forty-five volumes and encompassing in excess of three thousand entries arranged in alphabetical order, the encyclopedia presents with meticulous precision the legal determinations of the four canonical Sunni juridical schools—the Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī madhāhib—while simultaneously incorporating the perspectives of the early luminaries of Islamic jurisprudence. It thus stands as an important contemporary repository of Islamic legal thought, synthesizing classical scholarship with contemporary methodological approaches.

The article is presented below in its entirety, with minimal additional commentary.